Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545


PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr


nom site cnrs ENS EHESS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech INRA Université Paris 1

Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 12 au 16 février 2018

Agenda du 12 au 16 février 2018


Lundi 12 février 2018

Régulation et environnement | 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
FODHA Mouez (Université Paris 1, PSE) : Environmental Tax Reform under debt constraint
COLO Philippe (PSE) : Uncertainty in environmental agreements

This article analyzes the impacts of Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) when the government is constrained not to increase the public debt-to-output ratio. We consider an overlapping generations model with pollution. Public spending for pollution abatement are …nanced by tax revenues and public debt. We show that keeping constant the public debt-output ratio is not an obstacle to attain a double dividend, i.e. an increase of both (i) environmental quality and (ii) aggregate consumption. First, if the capital stock is low and the pollution abatement is large enough, a successful ETR consists in a rise of the environmental tax, compensated by a decrease of the income tax. Secondly, we show that the environmental tax revenues may help reduce the public debt-output ratio. We give conditions (on the initial level of the environmental tax and the debt-output ratio) such that an increase of the environmental tax, budget-balanced by a decrease of the debt-output ratio may also achieve a double dividend. We conclude that public debt crisis should not compromise ETR, instead, environmental tax revenues could be part of the solution.

GSIE | 13:00-14:00
Salle S19, MSE, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
REVERDY Camille (ITC, UNCTAD-WTO) : The Export Potential of Services
Co-authors : DECREUX Yvan ; SPIES Julia

Roy | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ALOS-FERRER Carlos (University of Zurich) : Imperfect Bayesians : A Process Model and Evidence from Response Times

People are not Bayesians. Or are they ? This work discusses a simple process model of faulty decision making where deliberative processes standing in for Bayesian updating compete with simpler heuristics, resulting in predictable error and response-time patterns. The predictions are then tested in a decision-making experiment on belief updating where opposite biases can occur, representativeness (overweighting the sample information due to stereotypical appearances) and conservatism (overweighting the prior).

Mardi 13 février 2018

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SANTINI Paolo (PSE) : Do unions have egalitarian wage policies for their own employees ? Evidence from exhaustive earnings data in the US
Co-authors : BREDA Thomas (PSE) ; BRYSON Alex (UCL)

PSI PSE | 17:00-18:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BECERRA-VALBUENA Luis (PSE) : Do the ENSO events affect air quality and health in Bogotá

Mercredi 14 février 2018

Histoire économique | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
RUEDA Valeria (Oxford) : Political unification and geographic economic disparities in Italy 1861-71 
Co-Authors : A’HEARN Brian

Economie du développement | 16:30-18:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MANI Anandi (University of Oxord, Blavatnik School of Government) : COGNITIVE DROUGHTS‡
Co-authors : Guilherme Lichand (University of Zurich, Dept. of Economics)

This paper tests whether uncertainty about future rainfall affects farmers’ decision-making through cognitive load. Behavioral theories predict that rainfall risk could impose a psychological tax on farmers, leading to material consequences at all times and across all states of nature, even within decisions unrelated to consumption smoothing, and even when negative rainfall shocks do not materialize down the line. Using a novel technology to run lab experiments in the field, we combine survey experiments with recent rainfall shocks to test the effects of rainfall risk on farmers’ cognition, and find that it decreases farmers’ attention, memory and impulse control, and increases their susceptibility to a variety of behavioral biases. Effects are quantitatively important, equivalent to losing 25% of one’s harvest at the end of the rainy season. Evidence that farmer’s cognitive performance is relatively less impaired in tasks involving scarce resources suggests that the effects operate through the mental bandwidth mechanism.

Jeudi 15 février 2018

Comportement | 11:00-12:00
ADVANI Arun (University College London)

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45
PHILIPPE Arnaud (IAST/TSE) : Incarcerate one to calm the others ? Spillover effects of incarceration among criminal groups

What is the effect of incarcerating a member of a group on her criminal partners ? I answer this question using administrative data on all convictions in France between 2003 and 2012. I exploit past joint convictions to identify 34,000 groups. Using a 48-month individual panel that records later criminal activity and sentencing, I find that the incarceration of a peer is associated with a 5% decrease in the conviction rate in groups of two individuals. Exploiting within-group heterogeneity, I show that offenders who have the characteristics of leaders are not affected by their followers but exert influence on them. Lastly, I show that the effect derives from lower criminogenic behavior and not from a loss of criminal human capital or from better information on the risks associated with crime.
Texte intégral [pdf]

TOM | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CHONÉ Philippe (CREST) : Partial exclusivity

This papers offers a new rationale for exclusive agreements. Long-term business partners have a common interest to agree on an option to deal on an exclusive basis, while keeping the possibility to revert to a competitive process (auction) should the surplus of an internal deal turn out to be low. Partial exclusivity occurs in equilibrium in the sense that competition takes place with positive probability. Although there is no rent extraction à la Aghion and Bolton (1987), such lock-up agreements harm competitors (and total welfare) by depriving them of business opportunities. Compared to Bulow and Klemperer (1996), the possibility of long-term contracting calls into question the efficacy of auctions relative to negotiations.

Vendredi 16 février 2018

Economie politique du changement institutionnelle | 11:00-12:30
Salle 116, MSE, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
RAGOT Xavier (CNRS-Sciences Po, OFCE) : Changements organisationnels en Europe : Economie et Politique.

Casual Friday | 12:45-13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DESCHENES Sarah (PSE, INED) : Household structure, son preference and domestic violence in Burkina Faso