Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545


PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr


nom site cnrs ENS EHESS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech INRA Université Paris 1

Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 12 au 16 mars 2018

Agenda du 12 au 16 mars 2018


Lundi 12 mars 2018

GSIE | 13:00-14:00
Salle S19, MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris

ROY | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
VANNETELBOSCH Vincent (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain) : R&D Network Formation with Myopic and Farsighted Firms

We analyze the formation of bilateral R&D collaborations in an oligopoly when each ?rm bene ?ts from the research done by other ?rms it is connected to. Firms can be either myopic or farsighted when deciding about the links they want to form. Which R&D networks are likely to emerge with farsighted or myopic ?rms ? Which ?rms are more likely to occupy key positions in the R&D network ? What is the relationship between the stable R&D network structures and the social welfare ? We propose the notion of myopic- farsighted stable set to determine the R&D networks that emerge when some agents are myopic while others are farsighted. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of networks satisfying internal and external stability with respect to the notion of myopic-farsighted improving path. Stable R&D networks consist of two components where the larger group of ?rms derive from their R&D collaborations a greater competitive advantage relative to the other group. If there is a majority of myopic ?rms, they form two components of nearly equal size. However, if more than half of the ?rms are farsighted, the largest component comprises roughly three-quarters of ?rms, with farsighted ?rms having in average a higher degree and betweenness centrality than myopic ?rms. However, some myopic ?rms may have a high (if not the highest) betweenness centrality. Thus, even if myopic ?rms are less active in terms of R&D collaborations they may play a crucial role for spreading the innovation within the component. Suppose now that, in addition of myopic and farsighted private ?rms, some ?rms are public ones. We show that (myopic or farsighted) public ?rms can help to stabilize some e¢ cient R&D networks by occupying key positions in the networks. Finally, we study the dynamics of R&D networks starting from an initial state where all ?rms are myopic, and where at each subsequent period some myopic ?rms become farsighted.

Mardi 13 mars 2018

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PERSAUD Alexander (University of North Carolina Asheville) : A (Paid) Passage to India:Migration and revealed willingness to pay for upper-caste status

How much are upper-caste individuals willing to pay for upper-caste status ? Traditional dis-crimination models view discrimination from the vantage point of a group that receives worsetreatment due to its non-economic characteristics vis-a-vis a reference group. Discriminatedgroups pay a cost in the labor market for these characteristics. However, the corollary may betrue : a privileged group may pay a fee in order to receive better, rather than equal, treatment.In the case of caste, I hypothesize that high-caste Indians abroad are willing to pay more toreturn to India and reap the labor and non-labor benefits of high-caste status. I utilize uniquedata on indentured Indians in Fiji in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries. This contextremoves confounding labor-market factors and cleanly identifies the gross value of upper castes.I show that the lower bound of the value of the highest castes in north India roughly 2.5 years’gross wages. Robustness using hypothesized inter-caste hierarchies lead to the same orderingand diminishing effects as caste status falls. The effects are entirely driven by men, as women’scaste status appears delinked from return migration. My results show some of the first evidencequantifying a caste’s value and speak to caste’s persistence today.
Texte intégral [pdf]

PSI PSE | 17:00-18:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SEGÙ Mariona : Do short-term rent platforms affect rents ? Evidence from Airbnb in Barcelona

Mercredi 14 mars 2018

Histoire économique | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SALISBURY Laura (York University) : Marrying for Money : Evidence from the First Wave of Married Women’s Property Laws in the U.S.

Jeudi 15 mars 2018

Comportement | 11:00-12:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
HANAKI Nobuyuki (Universite Cote d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEG) : An experimental analysis of the effect of Quantitative Easing

In this paper we report the results of a repeated experiment in which a central bank buys bonds for cash in a quantitative easing (QE) operation in an otherwise standard asset market setting. The experiment is designed so that bonds have a constant fundamental value which is not affected by QE under rational expectations. By repeating the same experience three times, we investigate whether participants learn that prices should not rise above the fundamental price in the presence of QE. We find that some groups do learn this but most do not, instead becoming more convinced that QE boosts bond prices. These claims are based on significantly different behaviour of two treatment groups relative to a control group that doesn’t have QE.

Economie du développement | 16:30-18:00
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
FAFCHAMPS Marcel (Stanford University ) : Can Referral Improve Targeting ? Evidence from a Vocational Training Experiment

We seek to improve the targeting of agricultural extension training by inviting past trainees to select future trainees from a candidate pool. Some referees are rewarded or incentivized. Training increases the adoption of recommended practices and improves performance on average, but not all trainees adopt. Referred trainees are 3.7% more likely to adopt and randomly selected trainees, but rewarding or incentivizing referees does not improve referral quality. When referees receive financial compensation, average adoption increases and referee and referred are more likely to coordinate their adoption behavior. Additional adopters induced by incentivizing referral adopt imperfectly and incur losses from adoption ; they also tend to abandon the new practices in the following year.

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
LICHTER Andreas (IZA) : The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance : Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany
Co-authors : Max Löffler and Sebastian Siegloch

We investigate the long-run effects of government surveillance on trust and economic performance. We study the case of the Stasi in socialist East Germany, which implemented one of the largest state surveillance systems of all time. Exploiting regional variation in the number of spies and the specific administrative structure of the system, we combine a border discontinuity design with an instrumental variables approach to estimate the long-term causal effect of government surveillance after the fall of the Iron Curtain. We find that a larger spying density in the population led to persistently lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust in post-reunification Germany. We also find evidence of substantial and long-lasting economic effects of Stasi spying, resulting in lower income and higher exposure to unemployment.

TOM | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
KOPYLOV Igor (University of California, Irvine) : Combinatorial Subjective State Spaces

I construct subjective state spaces S for preferences over finite menus. The additive representation of Kreps (1979) is relaxed to a weaker model called coherent aggregation. This model improves the identification of subjective states in several ways. First, the minimal size of S can be specified explicitly in terms of preferences. It allows combinatorial applications : starting from monotonic preferences over menus that have at most k elements, one can identify subjective state spaces that have up to k states. Second, coherent aggregation can be non-monotonic and hence, accommodate preferences for commitment. The case of singleton S delivers Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2005) model of changing tastes. Third, the coherent aggregation model has equivalent interpretations in terms of incomplete dominance relations and choice functions that are both inducedendogenously by preferences. The induced dominance has a Pareto representation with subjective states. The induced choice function C is rationalized via strict maximization of subjective states. The path-independence of C characterizes the case where all subjective states are linear orders, as in Aizerman and Malishevski (1981).

PEPES | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BAHAR Dany (The Brookings Institution) : Diasporas, return migration and comparative advantage : a natural experiment of Yugoslavian refugees in Germany
Co-authors : HAUPTMANN Andreas (IAB), OZGUZEL Cem (PSE), RAPOPORT Hillel (PSE)

During the early 1990s Germany received over half-million Yugoslavians escaping war. By 2000, most of these refugees were repatriated. In this paper we exploit this episode to provide causal evidence on the role migrants play in expansion of the export baskets of their home countries after their return. We find that the elasticity of exports to return migration is between 0.1 and 0.25 in industries were migrants were employed during their stay in Germany. In order to deal with endogeneity issues we use historic rules of random allocation of asylum seekers across different German states to construct an instrumental variable for the treatment. We find our results to be externally valid when expanding the sample to all countries. We also find that the effect is over 10 times stronger for migrant workers in white collar occupations, as opposed to non-white collars. Similarly, the effect is 3 and 4 times larger upon return migration of workers with occupations intensive in analytical and cognitive tasks (as opposed to manual ones) and with high problem-solving content (as opposed to low content), respectively. Our results point to knowledge diffusion as the main channel driving the link between migration and productivity as measured by changes in comparative advantage.

Macroworkshop | 14:00-15:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
WIBAUX Pauline (PSE) : Trade and Currency weapons

    The debate on currency wars has re-emerged in the wake of the exceptionally accommodative monetary policies carried out after the 2008 global financial crisis. Using product level data for 110 countries over the 1989-2013 period, we estimate trade elasticities to exchange rates and tariffs within the same empirical specification, using a gravity approach. We find that the impact of a 10 percent depreciation of the exporter country’s currency is « equivalent » to a cut in the power of the tariff in the destination country in the order of 2.4 to 3.4%. We then study the policy implications of these results based on a stylized macroeconomic model. Faced with a negative demand shock, the policy-maker of a small open economy may cut the home interest rate (and let depreciate its currency), increase the import tariffs, or combine an interest-rate cut with a reduced import tariffs. We find that monetary policy is more effective than trade policy in stabilizing output. If the internal transmission channel of monetary policy is muted (at the zero-lower bound), the incentive to carry out a non-cooperative policy is increased, but more through a « trade war » than through a « currency war ». The two-country extension of our model confirms these results, but the incentive to increase import tariffs is much more limited in this case.

Vendredi 16 mars 2018

Soutenance de thèse
VINEZ Margaux | 14h30
Terres et agriculture en milieu forestier : essais sur des politiques historique et contemporaine en République Démocratique du Congo. Rumble in the jungle | Sous la direction de MACOURS Karen et LAMBERT Sylvie

Economie et psychologie | 11:00-12:30
Salle 1, MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
TARROUX Benoît (CREM, Univ. Rennes 1)

Casual Friday | 13:15-14:15
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JAROTSCHKIN Alexandra (PSE) : Diffusion of (non-)discriminatory culture : Evidence from Stalin’s ethnic deportations