Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545


PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr


nom site cnrs ENS EHESS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech INRA Université Paris 1

Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 16 au 20 octobre 2017

Agenda du 16 au 20 octobre 2017


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Lundi 16 octobre 2017

Soutenance de thèse
Three empirical essays on moral hazard identification in insurance - Directeur de thèse : Geoffard Pierre-Yves

Théorie des jeux | 11:00-12:00
Salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l’Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
SOLAN Eilan (Tel Aviv University )

Régulation et environnement | 12:00-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CHEN Zhijun (Monash University) : Competitive Personalized Pricing with Sophisticated Consumers
CHONGWOO Choe, Monash University

Abstract Personalized pricing, a limiting case of price discrimination as the number of targeted consumer segments increases, becomes increasingly common due to the availability of vast amount of individual-level data. This paper studies personalized pricing in a Hotelling setting when each firm has a given target segment and consumers can be sophisticated. Sophisticated consumers can overcome the hurdles for price discrimination and have access to the price offered to non-targeted consumers, which naive consumers cannot. When all consumers are naive, personalized pricing leads to intense competition and total industry profit lower than that under the Hotelling equilibrium. But market is always fully covered. Sophisticated consumers raise the firm’s cost of serving non-targeted consumers, hence discourage firms from poaching the rival’s targeted customers. This softens competition. When firms have sufficiently large and non-overlapping target segments, consumer sophistication allows firms to extract full surplus from their targeted customers through perfect price discrimination. Consumers are strictly worse-off under competitive personalized pricing, a result in contrast to the common view in the literature. With sophisticated consumers, firms also choose not to serve the entire market when the commonly non-targeted market segment is small. Thus consumer sophistication can lead to lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the use of customer data by firms. Key words : Personalized pricing, consumer sophistication, customer targeting, privacy JEL Classification : D43, D8, L13, L5
Texte intégral [pdf]

GSIE | 13:00-14:00
Salle S/3, MSE, 106 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris

ROY | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PENTA Antonio (UW-Madison) : Rationalizability and Observability

Mardi 17 octobre 2017

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R1-09 Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MEHMOOD Sultan (PSE & Paris-Dauphine) : Judiciary’s Achilles Heel : Executive Control via Appointment Power

How does an increase of executive constraints impact the judiciary ? We exploit a change in judicial selection procedure in a weak democracy, from the president selecting the judges to the selection of judges through a judicial commission, to ascertain the causal effects of an increase in executive constraints on judicial independence. By exploiting the across-district and over-time variation in reform exposure generated by random exit of judges, we are able to ascertain the causal effect of this reform on judicial outcomes. We find that this reform has a large effect on judicial independence. In particular, we show that the change in the selection procedure of judges caused a 20% reduction in state victories. This increase in independence does not come at the expense of increased case delay. Furthermore, the analysis of mechanisms reveal that the steepest fall in state victories occurred in less politically connected districts. We also provide suggestive evidence that the new appointment procedure also incentivised the incumbent judges to adjudicate against the state more often, though less so than the judges appointed under the new selection procedure.
Trade | 14:45-16:15
ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405
ANDERSON James (Boston College) : *Short Run Gravity
Texte intégral [pdf]
ONG | 14:30-17:00
Campus Jourdan - Salle R1-15
JACQUEMART Karine (Director - Foodwatch France)
PLATTEAU Jean Philippe (University of Namur)
14:30-15:20 - Karine Jacquemart (Director - Foodwatch France)
Insights from a citizen-based watchdog in the food sector

15:20-15:50 - Coffee Break

15:50-16:40 Jean Philippe Platteau (University of Namur)
Optimal management of transfers : an odd paradox (with François Bourguignon)
PSI PSE | 17:00-18:00
TENAND Marianne : Horizontal equity in professional home care use. An assessment in the context of the French APA scheme

Mercredi 18 octobre 2017

Histoire économique | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MCGAUGHEY Ewan (Kings College) : On the history of co-determination and power sharing/worker voting rights in company boards

Economie du développement | 16:30-18:00
Salle R2-21 campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MORTEN Melanie (Stanford University ) : Migration and Consumption Insurance in Bangladesh.

Séminaire de lancement du nouveau MSc EDCBA
Séminaire de lancement du nouveau Master of Science “Economic Decision and Cost Benefit Analysis".
18 octobre 2017 - Campus Jourdan, Paris. 17h > 19h

Jeudi 19 octobre 2017

MacroWorkshop | 14:00-15:00
Jonas Heipertz (PSE)
Balance-Sheet Diversification in General Equilibrium : Identification and Network Effects
Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris, salle R2-20

The paper uses disaggregated data on asset holdings and liabilities to estimate a general equilibrium model where each firm determines the diversification and size of the asset and liability sides of its balance-sheet. The model endogenously generates two types of financial networks : (i) a network of institutions when two institutions share common asset or liability holdings or when an institution holds an asset that is the liability of another. In both cases demand/supply decisions by one institution affect the value of other institutions’ holdings/liabilities, (ii) a network of financial instruments implied by the distribution of assets and liabilities within and across institutions. A change in the price of one asset induces change in demand/supply for all other assets, thus generating price comovement. The general equilibrium analysis predicts the propagation of real, financial and regulatory shocks as well as the change in the network caused by the shock.

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45
FORTIN Bernard (Université Laval) : Physicians’ Response to Incentives : Evidence on Hours of Work and Multitasking

We measure the response of physicians to monetary incentives using administrative data on Quebec (Canada) specialists. Our data contain information on the different services provided by individual physicians and their hours worked. These data cover a period during which the Quebec government changed the relative prices paid for medical services. We develop a multitasking model to estimate the manner in which physicians reacted to these price changes. Optimal behaviour within our model implies a wage index that determines the marginal return to clinical hours worked when those hours are optimally distributed across services. This index, in turn, generates an earnings equation which we estimate using both limited and full-information methods. Our results confirm that physicians respond to incentives in predictable ways. The own-price substitution effects of a price change are both economically and statistically significant. Income effects are present, but small for individual services. They are more important in the presence of broad-based fee increases which can lead to physicians reducing the supply of services.

TOM | 13:00-14:00
Salle R2-20, campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LOVO Stefano (HEC Paris)

We explore a sequential fund-raising mechanism with common values and an all-or-nothing clause (i.e., a target level of funds must be raised in order for the project to be implemented). We show that in the maximum truth-telling equilibria the presence of the all-or nothing clause decreases the probability of abstention cascade but it increases the probability of pledging cascades. Compared to the socially optimal outcome these campaign lead to an excessive implementation of projects. Social optimum can be restored by allowing backers to opt in and out at the end of the campaign.

Vendredi 20 octobre 2017

Casual Friday Development Seminar | 12:45-13:45
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DUTRONC-POSTEL Paul : Land expropriation and bureaucrat promotion in China
Co-authors : Maiting Zhuang (PSE)