PjSE

Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545





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PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
France
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr

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nom site cnrs ENS EHESS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech INRA Université Paris 1

Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 19 au 24 mars 2018

Agenda du 19 au 24 mars 2018

UMR8545

Lundi 19 mars 2018

Régulation | 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MILLOCK Katrin (CNRS) : Accelerating diffusion of climate-friendly technologies : a network perspective
MAYOL Alexandre (PSE, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ) : Providing public utilities in a common agency framework : making, buying and governance
with HALLECK VEGA Solmaria and MANDEL Antoine
Résumé

Abstract 1 : We introduce a methodology to estimate the determinants of the formation of technology diffusion networks from the patterns of technology adoption. We apply this methodology to wind energy, which is one of the key technologies for climate change mitigation. Technology diffusion occurs at the firm level, but it is influenced by policy and we study how policy affects network formation at a country level. Our results emphasize that long-term economic and trade relationships, as measured in particular by economic integration, are key determinants of technological diffusion. Specific support measures seem less relevant for the diffusion per se, although they might play a crucial role from an industrial perspective. Abstract 2 : This article analyzes how the local political organization (in France, the level of the single municipality, the union of communes (Syndicats) or supermunicipality (communaut de communes) and the management mode (public or private) can influence the performance of the public service. The impact of these organizational configurations on costs has never been studied simultaneously by the literature. We first propose a theoretical model based on a principal-agent problem to analyze them together. Then, from a panel of French water services, we observe empirically that these different organizational ombinations have an impact on the price.

ROY | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
YARIV Leeat (Princeton University) : On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets
Co-authors : SangMok Lee
Résumé

Stability is often the goal for matching clearinghouses, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. We study the wedge between stability and utilitarian efficiency in large one-to-one matching markets. We show stable matchings are efficient asymptotically for a rich preference class. The speed at which efficiency of stable matchings converges to its optimum depends on the underlying preferences. Furthermore, for severely imbalanced markets governed by idiosyncratic preferences, or when preferences are sub-modular, stable outcomes may be inefficient asymptotically. Our results can guide market designers who care about efficiency as to when standard stable mechanisms are desirable.

Soutenance de thèse | 19:00
SEROR Avner. Essays on Political Economy and Cultural Evolution sous la directtion VERDIER Thierry
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

Mardi 20 mars 2018

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PIKETTY Thomas : Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right. Rising Inequality and the Changing Structure of Political Conflict (Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017)
Texte intégral [pdf]

Trade | 14:30-16:00
Salle R2-21, Campus PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DORN D. (Zurich) : Foreign Competition and Domestic Innovation : Evidence from U.S. Patents.
Co-authors : AUTOR David, HANSON Gordon, PISANO Gary and SHU Pian
Texte intégral [pdf]

PSI PSE | 17:00-18:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LUKSIC Juan Diego (PSE) : Impact of a large earthquake in Chile on school learning outcomes

Mercredi 21 mars 2018

Cultural Transmission and the Economics of Cultural Change Theory, Empirics and Experiments - I
Abstract

TWO CONFERENCES ON THE ECONOMICS OF CULTURE (21-24 March 2018)

Download the programme in pdf

Registration
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc8PKn4Rs7ZDpE9ZxgLWnVFJqjovPy9bxgv-gbSzwsjPtXAwA/viewform
More about the 2nd conference [March 23-24, 2018] : download the programme in pdf

Histoire économique | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MONTALBO Adrien (PSE) : Economic resources and primary schooling in the early nineteenth-century France
Résumé

The Guizot Law of 1833 was the first step undertaken in France towards the organization of primary schooling at a national level, making it mandatory for municipalities more than 500 inhabitants to open a primary school for boys. To this date, primary schooling was mostly managed by municipal authorities who could freely decide to subsidise schools or to let them be entirely funded through schooling fees paid by families. A national survey was conducted in 1833 to determine the location of the existing primary schools. Exploiting the data coming from this survey at the arrondissements (departmental districts) and municipal levels, I investigate the economic determinants of primary schooling spreading in France before the Guizot Law. I first show that economic resources and population dispersion were key in explaining primary schools’ presence, municipal grants and higher enrolment rates. The percentage of municipalities with schools along with the percentage of teachers provided with an accommodation, a classroom, a fixed salary or an occupation by municipalities were indeed higher in wealthier districts. Then, I show that the pattern of this investment was also depending on the population deciles municipalities were belonging to. Finally, I investigate the link between municipal grants and enrolment rates. Local authorities acted to lower the level of fees in the schools they subsidised, which reduced the costs of education borne by families and contributed to increase enrolment rates. Primary schooling thus developed mostly in areas where it was economically valuable, through the concomitant action of municipalities and families, which divided the burden of education costs.

Economie du développement | 16:30-18:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
UDRY Chris (Northwestern University )

Jeudi 22 mars 2018

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ELLISON Glenn (MIT) : Dynamics of the Gender Gap in High Math Achievement
Co-author : SWANSON Ashley
Résumé

This paper examines the dynamics of the gender gap in high math achievement over the high school years using data from the American Mathematics Competition. A clear gender gap is already present by 9th grade and the gender gap widens over the high school years. High-achieving students must substantially improve their performance from year to year to maintain their within-cohort rank, but there is nonetheless a great deal of persistence in the rankings. Several gender-related differences in the dynamics contribute to the widening of the gender gap, including differences in dropout rates and in the mean and variance of year-to-year improvements among continuing students. A decomposition indicates that the most important difference is that fewer girls make large enough gains to move up substantially in the rankings. An analysis of students on the margin of qualifying for a prestigious second stage exam provides evidence of a discouragement effect : some react to falling just short by dropping out of participating in future years, and this reaction is more common among girls

TOM | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BAUMANN Léonie (University of Cambridge) : Identifying the best agent in a network
Résumé

This paper develops a mechanism for a principal to allocate a prize to the most valued agent when agents have a knowledge network. The principal does not know any agent’s value but any two linked agents know each other’s values. Agents compete for the prize and send costless private messages about their own value and the values of others they know to the principal. Agents can lie only to a certain extent and only lie if it increases their chances of winning the prize. A mechanism that determines each agent’s chances of winning for any possible message profile is proposed. We show that with this mechanism, there exists an equilibrium such that the most valued agent wins with certainty if every agent has at least one link ; if the network is a star or complete, then the most valued agent wins with certainty in every equilibrium.

PEPES | 12:30-14:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DO Quy-Toan (The World Bank) : The Price Elasticity of African Elephant Poaching

Vendredi 23 mars 2018

Culture, Institutions and Prosperity - II

TWO CONFERENCES ON THE ECONOMICS OF CULTURE (21-24 March 2018)

Culture, Institutions and Prosperity


Registration
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc8PKn4Rs7ZDpE9ZxgLWnVFJqjovPy9bxgv-gbSzwsjPtXAwA/viewform
More about the 1st conference [March 21-22, 2018] : download the programme in pdf
 
 
 
 
 
EPCI | 11:00-12:30
Salle 18, MSE-Paris 1, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital 75013 Paris
RAGOT Xavier (OFCE) : Changements organisationnels en Europe : Economie et Politique

Economie et psychologie | 11:00-12:30
Salle 1, MSE-Paris 1, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital 75013 Paris
LEFEBVRE Mathieu (BETA, Univ. Strasbourg)

Samedi 24 mars 2018

Culture, Institutions and Prosperity - II

TWO CONFERENCES ON THE ECONOMICS OF CULTURE (21-24 March 2018)

Culture, Institutions and Prosperity


Registration
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc8PKn4Rs7ZDpE9ZxgLWnVFJqjovPy9bxgv-gbSzwsjPtXAwA/viewform
More about the 1st conference [March 21-22, 2018] : download the programme in pdf

UMR8545