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Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545





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PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
France
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr

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Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 29 janvier au 2 février 2018

Agenda du 29 janvier au 2 février 2018

UMR8545

Lundi 29 janvier 2018

GSIE | 13:00-14:00
Salle S3, MSE, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
LEYVA Jaime (Paris 1, PSE) : International Banking Flows, The Global Financial Cycle and Local Developments
Résumé

The Global Financial Cycle has received a big attention in the last years. Many works have found a significant and negative mean effect of some Global Financial Cycle proxies such as the VIX in risky asset prices, capital flows and leverage across different countries. This paper tries to assess the importance of the Global Financial Cycle in explaining international banking flows conditioning on the heterogeneous response of local variables to global shocks. We use the correlated part of local stock market volatility with the US stock market volatility to quantify the heterogeneous local response to global high uncertainty periods and then we test the explanatory power of the country-specific response to global shocks in a panel of international banking flows to Small Open Economies. Our results seem to asses that there is an active coordination behaviour of the Global Banking system to more exposed countries under high uncertainty periods, and taking into account the heterogeneous responses in stock markets outperforms the explanatory power of a common Global proxy of volatility. Finally, we develop a Small Open Economy DSGE model in which we analyse the impact of international interest rate shocks under different degrees of financial frictions in the local banking system to explain the heterogeneous response of local economic variables and capital flows under a global shock.

Roy | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
VIDA Peter (Université de Cergy-Pontoise) : Strategic Stability of Equilibria in Multi-Sender Signaling Games

Mardi 30 janvier 2018

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CARBONNIER Clement ( Université de Cergy-Pontoise) : Wage Incidence of Corporate Income Taxes : market equilibrium versus rent sharing
Co-authors : MALGOUYRES Clement (Banque de France & Science Po) ; PY Loriane (Banque de France & IPP) ; URVOY Camille (Science Po)
Résumé

We take advantage of the introduction of a large tax credit (Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit - CETC) in France in 2013 to assess the wage incidence of corporate income tax. The eligibility rules of the scheme - proportional to the wagebill for individual compensations lower than 2.5 minimum wage - generate a strong discontinuity, upon which we build our identification strategies. Thanks to the match of employer and employee exhaustive admistrative databases, we are able to contrast the corporate income tax incidence on wages at individual and firm levels. The individual-data based analysis studies the deformation of the distribution of wages and hires around the notch, following bunching literature. The firm-level analysis consists in difference-in-difference between firms matched within cells defined according to their wage cumulative density function. The source of variation in treatment intensity stems from pre-reform wage differences in a tight window around the threshold. We show that there exists a discrepancy between the absence of bunching at the individual level and the substantial incidence on wages at the firm level, espcially for high-skill workers. This suggests that rent-sharing or other firm-level wage setting mechanisms are key to fully understand the incidence of such tax credit policy.

NGO | 14:30-17:30
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
Résumé

14:30-15:20 - Philippe Garnier (NGO CRAterre, Architect and researcher)
”On the transition between emergency aid, reconstruction and long term development”

15:20-16:10 Ruben Durante (Sciences Po)
”The life of others : explaining differences in news coverage of human losses around the world”
(with M. Djourelova and E. Papaioannou”)

16:10-16:40 Coffee Break

16:40-17:30 Nancy Carfrae (UIA - Union of International Associations, coordinator)

“UIA : 100 years of documenting international civil society”

PSI PSE | 17:00-18:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LIPPMANN Quentin (PSE) : Women Working on Women : Evidence from French Politics

Mercredi 31 janvier 2018

Séance 2 du cycle « Évaluation d’impact des politiques publiques » | 13:30-17:00
Abstract

 
France Stratégie coordonne un cycle de six séminaires sur l’évaluation d’impact des politiques publiques, en partenariat avec différents laboratoires de recherche et institutions. La deuxième séance sera consacrée à la portée des résultats des évaluations d’impact et aux recommandations et enseignements que l’on peut en tirer.
Veuillez trouver toutes les informations ainsi que le formulaire d’inscription sur ce lien

Economie du développement | 16:30-18:00
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CARIA Stefano (University of Oxford) : The Selection of Talent : Experimental and Structural Evidence from Ethiopia
Co-authors : ABEBE Girum ; ORTIZ-OSPINA Esteban
Résumé

We study how search frictions in the labour market affect firms’ ability to recruit talented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. The size of the effect is equivalent to doubling the wage offer for the same position. Estimates from a structural model suggest that application incentives are effective because (i) the cost of making a job application is large (on average 9-13 percent of the monthly wage), especially among talented low-income jobseekers ; and (ii) 30 percent of individuals are unable to pay this cost due to credit constraints. In a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts of application incentives. This can explain why the use of this intervention is limited in our context. Our findings highlight that financial incentives for job applications can improve the selection and allocation of talent.

Jeudi 1er février 2018

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MELLY Blaise (University of Bern) : Generic Inference on Quantile and Quantile Effect Functions for Discrete Outcomes
Résumé

Quantile and quantile effect functions are important tools for descriptive and inferential analysis due to their natural and intuitive interpretation. Existing inference methods for these functions do not apply to discrete and mixed continuous-discrete random variables. This paper offers a simple, practical construction of the simultaneous confidence bands for quantile and quantile effect functions. It is based on a natural transformation of simultaneous confidence bands for distribution functions, which are readily available for many problems. The construction is generic and does not depend on the nature of the underlying problem. It works in conjunction with parametric, semiparametric, and nonparametric modeling strategies and does not depend on the sampling scheme. We apply our method to characterize the distributional impact of insurance coverage on health care utilization and obtain the distributional decomposition of the racial test score gap. Our analysis generates new, interesting empirical findings, and complements previous analyses that focused on mean effects only. In both applications, the outcomes of interest are discrete rendering existing inference methods invalid for obtaining uniform confidence bands for quantile and quantile effects functions.
Texte intégral [pdf]

TOM | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
LARAKI Rida (CNRS et Dauphine) : Acyclic Gambling Games
Co-authors : RENAULT J.
Résumé

We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology of the title comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino. Under natural assumptions (such as continuous running payoff and non expansive transitions), we consider for each discount factor the value $v_\lambda$ of the $\lambda$-discounted stochastic game and investigate its limit when $\lambda$ goes to 0 (players are more and more patient). We show that under a strong acyclicity condition, the limit exists and is characterized as the unique solution of a system of functional equations : the limit is the unique continuous excessive and depressive function such that each player, if his opponent does not move, can reach the zone when the current payoff is at least as good than the limit value, without degrading the limit value. The approach generalizes and provides a new viewpoint on the Mertens-Zamir system coming from the study of zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides. A counterexample shows that under a slightly weaker notion of acyclicity, convergence of $(v_\lambda)$ may fail.

Vendredi 2 février 2018

Economie et psychologie | 11:00-12:30
Salle S1, MSE, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
CROSETTO Paolo (INRA-GAEL)

UMR8545