Mercredi 2 mai
Histoire économique | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
HUBERMAN Michael (Université de Montréal) : Domestic Barriers to Internal and International Trade : New Evidence for Brazil, 1920-1940
Economie du développement | 16:30 - 18:00
Salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
LEON Gianmarco (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE and IPEG) : Teacher Wages, Student Achievement and the Recruitment of Talent in Rural Peru
Jeudi 3 mai
RUES | 14:30 - 17:30
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
18th RUES session
Transport and spatial sorting
Conference program13:30 Lecture 1 : Frédéric Robert-Nicoud (Université de Genève)
Title : “Highways, Market Access, and Spatial Sorting” - with Stephan Fretz (Swissgrid) and Raphaël Parchet (USI)
Discussant : Isabelle Méjean (CREST-Ecole Polytechnique)
14:30 Lecture 2 : Helen Simpson (University of Bristol)
Title : “Commuting Fast and Slow : The Effects of High Speed Rail” - with Stephan Heblich (University of Bristol)
Discussant : Mariona Segú (RITM-University Paris Sud)
15:30 Coffee break
16:00 Lecture 3 : Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal (IEB-Universitat de Barcelona)
Title : “Amphitheaters, cathedrals and operas : The role of historic amenities on suburbanization" - with Miquel-Àngel Garcia-López and Ilias Pasidis (IEB-Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Discussant : Benjamin Carantino (PSE-Paris School of Economics)
Conference venue
Paris School of Economics - Ecole d’Economie de Paris (PSE)
Room 2-21 (Main building Oikos)
48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 ParisTransport access : RER B - stop at « Cité Universitaire » or Metro Line 4 - Stop at « Porte d’Orléans »How to get here ?
Organizing Committee
Laurent Gobillon : laurent.gobillon psemail.eu
Miren Lafourcade : miren.lafourcade ens.fr Comportement | 11:00-12:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PRATI Alberto (Université de Marseille) : Retrospective self-serving believes on dating events : an empirical study using subjective well-being data
Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GOUSSÉ Marion (Laval University) : More or Less Unmarried. The Impact of Legal Settings of Cohabitation on Labor Market Outcomes
Co-author : Marion Leturcq
Résumé
We show how the legal settings of unmarried cohabitation affect partners’ labor market outcomes. In Canada, cohabiting couples are automatically entitled to certain rights after a few years of cohabitation. In some provinces, ex-cohabiting partners can claim for alimony upon separation, in others they can claim for an equal split of all the assets acquired during the relationship. As legal settings of unmarried cohabitation differ across time, provinces and duration of the relationship, it provides a unique framework to analyze how different levels of commitment affect couples’ decision regarding labor market supply. Using cross-provinces variation in the legal settings and minimum duration for eligibility, we show that unmarried cohabiting men increase their labor force supply when they become eligible to a more committed cohabitation regime, whereas women decrease theirs. Higher levels of commitment induce larger effects on labor market outcomes.
TOM | 12:30-13:30
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GOSSNER Olivier (CNRS and X and LSE) : Dynamic Bank Runs
Résumé
We study a model of dynamic bank runs under private information. We characterize a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies, discuss the informational and fundamental determinants of bank stability and compare outcomes in the dynamic model to its static counterpart.
PEPES | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BARSBAI Toman (Kiel Institute) : From exodus to exitus : Selective emigration after Germany’s failed 1848 revolutions and the rise of the Nazi Party
Vendredi 4 mai
Economie et psychologie | 11:00-12:30
Salle 1, MSE, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
Christos Ioannou (Univ. Southampton) : An Experimental Study of Uncertainty in Coordination Games
Résumé
Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Common Knowledge Coordination games, where fundamentals are commonly known by all players. Global games assume that agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals, whereas Poisson games model the number of actual players as a Poisson random variable to capture population uncertainty in large games. The present study investigates in a controlled setup, using as controls Common Knowledge Coordination games, whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals or uncertainty about the number of actual players may influence subjects’ behavior. Our findings suggest that uncertainty about the number of actual players has a more significant impact on subjects’ behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Furthermore, subjects’ behavior under Poisson population-size uncertainty is closer to the respective theoretical prediction than subjects’ behavior under idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals.
Casusal Friday | 12:45-13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PINTO Florencia (PSE) : Stay at home with Grandma, Mom is going to work