Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545


PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr


nom site cnrs ENS EHESS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech INRA Université Paris 1

Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 4 au 8 décembre 2017

Agenda du 4 au 8 décembre 2017


Lundi 4 décembre 2017

Soutenance | 15:30-18:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
Marlon SEROR : Trois essais sur l’économie de la migration | sous la direction de Flore Gubert

Régulation et environnement | 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SCHUMACHER Ingmar : Mitigation strategies when faced with the threat of solar radiation management

Roy | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
KLAUS Bettina : Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices

Abstract : We propose a new set of mechanisms, which we call serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for the allocation of one indivisible good. We show that a mechanism satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector and a priority ordering such that the mechanism is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices. We obtain a second characterization by replacing individual rationality with non-imposition. In both our characterizations the reservation price vector, the priority ordering, and the mechanism are all found simultaneously and endogenously from the properties. In addition, we show that in our model a mechanism satisfies Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and consistency if and only if it is welfare equivalent to a classical serial dictatorship. Finally, we illustrate how the normative requirements governing the functioning of some real life markets and the mechanisms that these markets use are reasonably well captured by our model and results.

Mardi 5 décembre 2017

Histoire économique | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-01 , Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ALAN Taylor (University of California Davis) : The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870–2015
Abstract : This paper answers fundamental questions that have preoccupied modern economic thought since the 18th century. What is the aggregate real rate of return in the economy ? Is it higher than the growth rate of the economy and, if so, by how much ? Is there a tendency for returns to fall in the long-run ? Which particular assets have the highest long-run returns ? We answer these questions on the basis of a new and comprehensive dataset for all major asset classes, including—for the first time—total returns to the largest, but oft ignored, component of household wealth, housing. The annual data on total returns for equity, housing, bonds, and bills cover 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015, and our new evidence reveals many new insights and puzzles.

Trade | 14:45-16:15
Salle H405, ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris
WILLMANN Gerald (Bielefeld) : *Unequal Gains, Prolonged Pain : A Model of Protectionist Overshooting
BLANCHARD Emily (Dartmouth)

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ALAN M. Taylor (University of California Davis) : The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870–2015

Migration | 16:30-19:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 rue Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ZENOU Yves (Monash University) : Conformism, Social Norms and the Dynamics of Assimilation (co-authors : Gonzalo Olcina and Fabrizio Panebianco)
COMOLA Margherita (Université Paris-Sud and PSE) : Network Formation in Quasi-Experimental Agrarian Reform Settlements : Evidence from Brazil (co-author : Mariapia Mendola)

Mercredi 6 décembre 2017

Séminaires finaux Job Market 2017-18
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris

Economie du développement | 16:30-18:00
Salle R2-20, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
ROGGER Daniel (World Bank Research Group) : Decentralization and Information : Empirical Evidence from Ethiopia

A common assertion is that decentralized agents such as local government organizations have better information than their centralized counterparts. We test this assertion by measuring the beliefs of public officials regarding the characteristics of the citizens they serve at the federal, regional and local levels of government in Ethiopia. By benchmarking these claims against validated administrative and survey data we show that local government officials make significantly lower errors in their estimates of citizen characteristics than other public officials. We are also able to show that there is no statistically significant difference between the errors made by managers and non-managers, implying that principals are no less informed than their agents. We investigate the determinants of these more accurate beliefs both non-experimentally and experimentally and provide evidence that distinct management practices rather than proximity to citizens underlies the more accurate beliefs we measure at the decentralized tiers of government

Jeudi 7 décembre 2017

Séminaires finaux Job Market 2017-18
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris

TOM | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
CARAYOL Nicolas (Université de Bordeaux ) : Evaluating the underlying qualities of items and raters from a series of reviews
Co-authors : JACKSON M. 

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
STANCANELLI Elena (Paris School of Economics) : Partial retirement and partners’ labor supply : learning from a Norwegian retirement reform

Flexible partial retirement stands out among policies aimed at extending individual working lives. Because most people of retirement age are partnered and likely plan their retirement together, partial retirement of one partner may impact labor supply of the other. We exploit a 2011 pension reform in Norway that incentivized partial retirement for some workers but not for others, focusing on couples in which only one partner directly faced changed incentives. Drawing on employer-employee register data matched with records from social security and population registers and using a difference-in-differences setup, we find that, for both men and women, the reform increased own labor supply by 5 to 7 hours per week and reduced the probability of full retirement by 20 percentage points. The reform also increased labor supply of wives of treated husbands by 1 to 2 hours per week and reduced their full retirement rate by 4 to 6 percentage points. In line with asymmetries in spousal employment responses found in prior studies, we do not uncover similar indirect effects for husbands of treated wives.

Macroéconomie | 15:45-17:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

Vendredi 8 décembre 2017

Economie et psychologie | 11:00-12:30
Salle 17 - MSE
DENANT-BOEMONT Laurent (Univ. Rennes 1, CREM)
Urban Sprawl, Transport Emissions and Compact City Policies : A Laboratory Experiment

Casual Friday | 12:45-13:45
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MCCAIG Brian (Wilfrid Laurier University) : FDI and human capital : Evidence from Vietnam
Co-authors : PAVNIK Nina (Dartmouth College) and WU Nancy (University of Oxford)

We examine the impacts on education of the rapid growth of FDI jobs in Vietnam between 2000 and 2008. We exploit the variation in timing of FDI job growth across provinces in Vietnam. Using cohort analysis from census data we demonstrate that FDI has mixed effects on years of schooling that depend critically on the exact specification. We supplement this analysis with nationally representative individual panel data that allows us to observe individual-level transitions from attending school to not attending school. We find evidence of an increase in school attendance in response to FDI jobs, but mixed evidence on the highest grade completed.