Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545


PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr


nom site cnrs ENS EHESS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech INRA Université Paris 1

Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 5 au 9 février 2018

Agenda du 5 au 9 février 2018


Lundi 5 février 2018

Régulation et environnement | 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BEZIN Emeline (PSE) : The Economics of Green Consumption, Cultural Transmission and Sustainable Technological Change.

A model shows that systematic interactions between green consumer culture and sustainable technologies can give rise to path dependency in sustainable innovation processes. The theory includes (i) green preferences formed through cultural transmission which involves rational socialization actions, (ii) innovation endogenously directed to sustainable or unsustainable sectors depending on culture through market size effects. When interactions between green culture and technology are strong enough, the dynamics exhibits complementarities resulting in path dependency. Two long-term outcomes emerge. A green equilibrium (with strong green culture and an environmentally benign technology), a brown equilibrium (with weak green culture and a pollution-intensive technology). The model has important implications for the cost of environmental policies. Moreover, the theory enables the study of an important disregarded issue, i.e., the political sustainability of environmental taxes.

Roy | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SPRUMONT Yves (Université de Montréal) : Strategy-proof Choice of Acts
Co-authors : BAHEL Eric

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes ; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of nature. We offer a complete characterization of all strategyproof and ex-post efficient SCFs. The chosen act must pick the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s top outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile ; it is the union of all the states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules.
Texte intégral [pdf]

Mardi 6 février 2018

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ALSTADSAETER Annette (NMBU) : Accounting for Business Income in Measuring Top Income Shares : Integrated Accrual Approach Using Individual and Firm Data from Norway

Business income is important in the upper tail of the personal income distribution, but the extent to which it is captured by measures of personal income varies substantially across tax regimes. Using linked individual and firm data from Norway, we are able to attribute business income to personal owners as it accrues rather than when it is realized. This adjustment leads to an increase in top income shares, and the size of this effect varies dramatically depending on the tax regime in place. After a tax reform in 2005 that created strong incentives to retain earnings within businesses, the increase was massive : accounting for earnings retained in the corporate sector leads to more than doubling of the share of income of top 0.1% in some years. Furthermore, adjusting for retained earnings stabilizes the composition of the top income group before and after the reform. We also show that the response is driven by majority owners in closely held firms and facilitated through indirect ownership. As the result, traditional measures of top income shares become misleadingly low (even when accounting for capital gains). We speculate on the implications of our findings for levels and trends in top income shares observed in other countries. In particular, we note that the major tax reforms of the 1980s in the United States correspond to a shift toward business income being passed through to personal owners, and argue that top income shares constructed using income tax statistics before 1987 are likely to be significantly understated relative to those afterwards.

Trade | 14:30-16:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ECKEL C. (Munich) : Too much of a good thing ? Exporters, multiproduct firms and labor market imperfections
Co-authors : YEAPLE Stephen R.
Texte intégral [pdf]

Mercredi 7 février 2018

Hstoire économique | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GOVIN Yajna (PSE) : Income Inequality : The case of Overseas Departments of France- Long Run Trends and Comparisons

Jeudi 8 février 2018

Groupe de travail Comportement | 10:00-11:00
Salle R1-11, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LOBECK Max (PSE) : An experimental study on the link between anti-social preferences and within firm mobility

Comportement | 11:00-12:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
VAN DER STRAETEN Karine (Toulouse School of Economics) : Voting corrupt politicians out of office : Evidence from an Experiment in Paraguay
Co-authors : CANETE Rumilda Canete, MIQUEL Pepita (Toulouse School of Economics & IAST) STRAUB Stephane (Toulouse School of Economics & IAST)
Corruption is a major threat to economic and social development. Democracy in itself is not necessarily conducive to less corruption. Voters may lack information on politicians’ wrongdoings, and electoral institutions may make it hard for them to remove corrupt politicians from office. From these premises, one might expect that more information and more open electoral systems, that is, systems giving voters more freedom to express their preferences over individual candidates, should help remove corrupt politicians from office. We propose a simple theoretical model describing voters’ behavior under closed list and open list proportional representation systems, and derive predictions regarding the impact of electoral rules and information on candidates’ electoral prospects. We test these hypotheses in a survey experiment performed in Paraguay taking advantage of a rare social uprising following a corruption scandal. We find that under the more open system, supporters of the incumbent party -the most corrupt party- do actually exhibit a preference for corrupt politicians, and that this is not due to a lack of information. Besides, under the open system, vote shares for the big political parties increase, especially so for the incumbent. Based on this evidence, we challenge the conventional view that more open electoral systems are necessarily good at fighting corruption.

TOM | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MACÉ Antoine (CNRS/GREQAM) : On the Weights of Sovereign Nations
Co-authors : TREIBICH Rafael

We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when participation in the committee is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to participate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation is enabled by the satisfaction of more stringent constraints, that may require granting a veto power to certain countries. The model has important implications for the problem of apportionment, the allocation of voting weights to countries of varying populations, where it provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller countries.

Vendredi 9 février 2018

Economie et psychologie | 11:00-12:30
Salle S1, MSE, 112 Boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
VILLEVAL Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE Lyon)
The spillover effects of monitoring institution on unethical behavior across contexts

We report on a field experiment conducted in public transportation and on the streets of a large city to study whether there are cross-context spillover effects of monitoring and punishment institution on unethical behavior. In the experiment, we first observe dishonesty in a natural setting (fare evasion in public transport), and then we expose subjects to an opportunity for unethical behavior in a different setting (accepting undeserved money on the street). This enables us to test (i) whether sanctioning fraud has a deterrence effect on fare-dodgers when they are exposed to a new opportunity to misbehave, and (ii) whether being inspected has any effect on the behavior of honest passengers in the new context. Our results show that monitoring increases the unethical behavior of both fare-dodgers and non-fare-dodgers in the second unrelated context. The crowding-out effect of monitoring across contexts increases in the number of inspectors. Our experiment rules out traditional explanations related to negative reciprocity which are typically proposed in single-context settings, and shows the importance of considering the spillover effets of institutions across contexts. Co-authors : Fabio Galeotti, Valeria Maggian
Casual Friday | 12:45-13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GARRIGA Santiago (PSE) : Cash for Whom ? Incidence of a Conditional Cash Transfer in Argentina