Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545


PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr


nom site cnrs ENS EHESS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech INRA Université Paris 1

Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 6 au 10 novembre 2017

Agenda du 6 au 10 novembre 2017


Lundi 6 novembre 2017

Soutenance de thèse
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 PARIS 
DEVOTO Florencia : Three Essays in Development Economics
Directeur de thèse GURGAND Marc

Régulation et environnement | 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BOURGEON Jean-Marc : Green Technology Adoption and the Business Cycle
Co-authors : Margot Hovsepian

Abstract : We analyze the adoption of green technology in a dynamic economy affected by random shocks where demand spillovers are the main driver of technological improvements. Firms’ beliefs and consumers’ anticipations drive the path of the economy. We derive the optimal policy of investment subsidy and the expected time and likelihood of reaching a targeted level of environmental quality under economic uncertainty. This allows us to estimate the value that should be given to the environment in order to avoid an environmental catastrophe as a function of the strength of spillover effects.
Roy | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LAUERMANN Stephan (Bonn) : Costly Advice"
Co-authors : Mehmet Ekmekci (Boston College)
Abstract We study a scenario in which a receiver is collecting non-binding advice for a binary decision from partially informed senders who can send binary messages. This reflects situations such as non-binding voting of shareholders on a management proposal. Under complete information, the preferences of the receiver and the senders are aligned but there is a conflict of interest over the trade-off of Type I and Type II errors. Existing work shows that for many such situations, the bias prohibits the transmission of any information. Here, in contrast to this work, we consider a setting in which one of the messages is costly. For example, there are positive costs of voting but no costs of abstention. We show that informative advice is given in any equilibrium. When there are many senders, with costly advice, the outcome is equivalent to the one under complete information.

Mardi 7 novembre 2017

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BEHNENDA Asma (PSE) : Absence, Substitutability and Productivity : Evidence from Teachers

Worker absence is a frequent phenomenon but little is known on its effects on productivity nor on organizations’ strategies to cope with this temporary disruptive event through substitute workers. Using a unique French administrative dataset matching, for each absence spell, each missing secondary school teacher to her substitute teacher, I find that the expected loss in daily productivity from teacher absences is on par with replacing an average teacher with one at the 15th percentile of the teacher value-added distribution. On average, tenured substitute teachers are able to compensate 30 % of this negative impact while contract substitute teachers do not have any statistically significant impact. This result has important implication for public policy in the context of the shortage of tenured teachers in disadvantaged areas, where contract teachers are more and more concentrated.
Texte intégral [pdf]

Paris trade | 14:45-16:15
Salle H405, ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405
O’ROURKE Kevin (Oxford) : * Empire, distance, and British exports 1700-1900

PSI PSE | 17:00-18:00
PITON Sophie (PSE) : Economic Integration and the Non-tradable sector : the European Experience

Mercredi 8 novembre 2017

Histoire économique | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SCALONE Francesco (Université de Bologne) : Neonatal mortality, Cold Weather and Socio-Economic Status in two Northern Italian Rural Parishes from 1820 to 1900

Economie du développement | 16:30-18:00
Salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd jourdan 75014 Paris
BHARADWAJ Prashant (UCSD) : Displacement and Development : Long Term Impacts of the Partition of India.

The partition of British India in 1947 resulted in one of the largest and most rapid migrations in human history. This paper examines how areas affected by the partition fare in the long run. Using migrant presence as a proxy for the intensity of the impact of the partition, and district level data on agricultural output between 1911-2009, we find that areas that received more migrants have higher average yields, are more likely to take up high yielding varieties (HYV) of seeds, and are more likely to use agricultural technologies. These correlations are more pronounced after the Green Revolution in India. Using pre-partition data, we show that migrant placement is uncorrelated with soil conditions, agricultural infrastructure, and agricultural yields prior to 1947 ; hence, the e ?ects are not solely explained by selective migration into districts with a higher potential for agricultural development. Migrants moving to India were more educated than both the natives who stayed and the migrants who moved out. Given the positive association of education with the adoption of high yielding varieties of seeds we highlight the presence of educated migrants during the timing of the Green Revolution as a potential pathway for the observed effects.

Jeudi 9 novembre 2017

Soutenance de thèse
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 PARIS 
Les manifestations socio-économiques du chômage de masse et les réaménagements des budgets de ménage pour y faire face. Le cas de la Grande Récession espagnole (2008-2015). Directeur de thèse : BOURDIEU Jérôme

Comportement | 11:00-12:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48, bld Jourdan 75014 PARIS
SICILIANI Luigi (University of YORK) : Competition and Equity in Health Care Markets (with Odd Rune Straume, University of Minho)

We provide a model where hospitals compete on quality under a fixed price regime to investigate (i) whether hospital competition, as measured by an increase in fixed prices or increased patient choice, increases or reduces the gap in quality between high- and low-quality hospitals, and as a result, (ii) whether competition increases or reduces (pure) health inequalities. The answer to the first question is generally ambiguous, but we find that that the scope for competition to result in quality convergence across hospitals is larger when the marginal health gains from quality decrease at a faster rate. Whether competition increases inequalities depends on the type of inequality. If marginal health gains decrease at a sufficiently slow rate, health inequalities due to postcode lottery will increase (decrease) whenever competition induces quality dispersion (convergence). Competition reduces health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients if patient composition effects, due to high-severity patients being more likely to exercise choice, are small.

PEPES | 12:30-14:00
Salle H402, Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris
BANERJEE Abhijit (MIT) : Information Delivery under Endogenous Communication : Experimental Evidence from the Indian Demonetization
Co-authors : Emily Breza, Arun Chandrasekar and Ben Golub 

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BRYSON Alex (University College London) : Union Density, Productivity, and Wages

We exploit tax-induced exogenous variance in the price of union membership to identify the effects of changes in firm union density on firm productivity and wages in the population of Norwegian firms over the period 2001 to 2012. Increases in union density lead to substantial increases in firm productivity and wages having accounted for the potential endogeneity of unionization. The wage effect is larger in more productive firms, consistent with rent-sharing models.

Macro Workshop | 14:00-15:00

Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris

PINTER Julien (Paris 1) : Breaking the Swiss Franc peg : afraid of financial losses ?


Constraints on a central bank’s ability to resist appreciation pressures by buying large amount of foreign reserves are not clearly known in nowadays’ central banking framework. In this paper we consider a central bank implementing a one-sided peg to prevent its currency from appreciating, such as the Swiss National Bank (SNB) between 2011-2015. We focus on the central bank ability to break its peg at any stage. We show that under redundant appreciation pressures there is a time at which this ability disappears for an independent central bank with a price stability objective such as the SNB, due to the insolvency risk. The central bank thus faces a trade-off between breaking its peg early or living indefinitely with it. We show that the same reasoning applies when the central bank cares about showing a positive level of equity. Applying our analysis to the Swiss National Bank peg, we show that in some scenarios the losses the SNB could have faced were such that the SNB indeed avoided to tie its hands by breaking its peg-policy in 2015. Assuming this was indeed a decision factor, ECB QE policy then appears as a potential key driver of this decision.

Macroéconomie | 15:45-17:00
Salle R2-21, PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CHALLE EDOUARD (polytechnique)

Vendredi 10 novembre 2017

Soutenance de thèse
Essays in firm dynamics, productivity and innovation.
Directeur de thèse : AGHION Philippe

Economie et psychologie |
Salle 17, MSE, 106 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
Brice Corgnet (EM Lyon, GATE)
Stressing You Out for Your Own Bad ! Reward Uncertainty and Work Addiction

Economie politique du changement institutionnel |
ROOM 116, MSE, 106 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris