Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques - UMR8545


PjSE - UMR8545
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
Tél : 01 80 52 16 00
pjse AT ens.fr


nom site cnrs ENS EHESS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech INRA Université Paris 1

Accueil du site > Séminaires > Agenda du 9 au 13 avril 2018

Agenda du 9 au 13 avril 2018

Lundi 9 avril 2018

Régulation et environnement | 12:00-14:00

Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GAGNEPAIN Philippe (Université Paris 1, PSE) : Market power and volatility in the airline industry

In a strategic game where firms compete against each other, the set of rationalizable strategies for each player entails all the best responses to the other’s decisions. The theoretical litterature has suggested that the uniqueness of the rationalizable outcomes coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the game. This paper proposes an empirical test of the existence of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly. We focus on the U.S. airline industry and develop a theoretical model of competition on each route.It is assumed that airlines are not always able to predict perfectly the behavior of the competitors which can result in multiplicity of rationalizable outcomes. Based on the supply and demand ingredients of our model, we construct a stability criterion which guarantees uniqueness. We conclude that more than 90% of the local markets observed in the U.S. airline industry have reached the unique possible Nash equilibrium. As a by-product, we also identify the main determinants which prevent firms from reaching an equilibrium. We showin particular that local markets which include a higher number of competitors are the ones where the quantity produced is more volatile.

GSIE | 13:00-14:00

Salle S19, MSE, 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris
HASANNUDIN ZENATHAN (University Paris 1)

ROY | 17:00-18:30

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DEB Rahul (University of Toronto, combined with TSE) : Screening (#FakeNews) in the Attention Economy

A substantial fraction of the online economy is financed by attention : frequently, consumers do not pay for the content they access and, instead, clicks are monetized by content providers (via advertising). We study a novel dynamic principal-agent framework in which the principal (a consumer) decides in each period if she should pay costly attention to the agent (a content provider), privately known to be genuine or fake. Genuine providers choose whether or not to release stochastically arriving content of varying quality whereas "fake news" sources can generate fake news at will. The consumer’s payoff depends on the (publicly observed and quality dependent) realized accuracy of the content. Our main result demonstrates how the presence of fake news sources distorts the behavior of genuine content providers : in all equilibria (subject to a mild refinement), both poor quality content (by genuine providers) and fake news (by fake news sources) must occur on path. These distortions are features of the attention economy and do not arise if the principal can commit or use transfers.

Mardi 10 avril 2018

Séance 3 Cycle Évaluation d’impact des politiques publiques : le cas de la politique de l’emploi | 13:30-17:00

France Stratégie coordonne un cycle de six séminaires sur l’évaluation d’impact des politiques publiques, en partenariat avec différents laboratoires de recherche et institutions. La troisième séance sera consacrée à la place des chercheurs dans l’évaluation des politiques publiques.

Téléchargez le programme en pdf

Veuillez trouver toutes les informations ainsi que le formulaire d’inscription sur ce lien.

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30

Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina (PSE) : Forced Migration and Human CapitalAccumulation : Evidence from Post-WWII Population Transfers
BECKER Sascha O. (University of Warwick) ; GROSFELD Irena (PSE) ; NICO Voigtlaender (UCLA)

We exploit a unique historical setting to study the long-run effects of forced migration on investment in education. As a result of World War II, the Polish borders were redrawn, resulting in large-scale migration. Poles were forced to move from the Kresy territories in the East (taken over by the USSR) and were resettled mostly to the newly acquired Western Territories, from which Germans were expelled. We combine historical censuses with newly collected survey data to show that Poles with a family history of forced migration are significantly more educated today, while there were no pre-WWII differences in education. This result holds when we restrict ancestral locations to a subsample around the former Kresy border, and when including fixed effects for the destination of migrants. The historical setting also allows us to narrow the comparison to forced migrants vs. voluntary migrants. The latter arrived from Central Poland, attracted by government programs to settle the largely emptied Western Territories.We find that — even within municipalities — descendants of forced migrants are more educated than the descendants of voluntary migrants.This difference is not driven by the selection of either group of migrants or by pre-war differences. Instead, survey evidence suggests that forced migration led to a shift in preferences, away from material possessions and towards investment in mobile assets such as human capital. The effects persist over three generations.

Migration | 16:30-19:00

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ADSERA Alicia (Princeton University) : Welfare states, Migration andSelection : Heterogeneous effects of social and econimic rights onmigrants flows
SARVIMÄKI Matti (Aalto University School of Business) : HabitFormation and the Misallocation of Labor : Evidence from Forced Migrations

PSI PSE | 17:00-18:00

Salle R1-13 , Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BATUT Cyprien (Paris School of Economics), TONDINI Alessandro (Paris School of Economics) : Working Hours Legislation, Employment and Productivity : Within-Country Evidence from Europe

Mercredi 11 avril 2018

Histoire économique | 12:30-14:00

Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WHITE Eugen : Censored Success : How to Prevent a Banking Panic, the Barings Crisis of 1890 Revisited

Financial histories have treated the Barings Crisis of 1890 as a minor or pseudo-crisis, presenting no threat to the systems of payment or settlement and readily managed by following Bagehot’s LOLR rule.New evidence reveals that Barings Brothers, a SIFI, was a deeply insolvent institution. Just as its true condition was revealed and a full-scale panic was about to ignite, the Bank of England stepped in ; but it did not respond as Bagehot recommended. While lending freely at a high rate on good collateral to other institutions, the Bank organized a pre-emptive lifeboat operation. Barings was split into a good bank that was recapitalized and a bad bank that had a prolonged but orderly liquidation supported by credit from the Bank. A financial crisis was thereby avoided, while steps were taken to mitigate the effects of moral hazard from this discretionary intervention. Contrary to the historical consensus for the pre-1914 era, central banks did not follow a strict Bagehot rule but exercised discretion when faced with the failure of a giant financial institution. Their success has led to a reading of history that has censored lessons in effective approaches to halting incipient crises.

Jeudi 12 avril 2018

Comportement | 11:00-12:00

Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
KONOW James (Loyola Marymount University, USA) : Can Economic Ethics Affect Attitudes and Behavior ?

Recent business scandals, economic upheavals and claims of broad types of unethical conduct among professional economists (e.g., List et al., 2001) have contributed to a growing discourse on returning economics to its origins as a “moral science” and on strengthening the emphasis on ethics in economics teaching and research, e.g., see Atkinson (2011), Bruni and Sugden (2013), DeMartino (2011), Sandel (2013), and Schiller and Schiller (2011). A now voluminous literature that began with Marwell and Ames (1981) and Carter and Irons (1991) asks “does studying economics lead to more self-interested behaviour ?” Here we turn this question on its head and ask “does studying ethics in an economic context affect moral attitudes or behavior ?” This presentation reports the results of two studies.“Does Studying Ethics Affect Moral Views ? : An Application to Economic Justice” considers whether the oldest and most traditional form of ethics instruction, namely philosophical ethics, can influence views of economic justice using the responses in surveys to contextually rich vignettes. “An Experimental Study of the Behavioral Effects of Ethics in the Economics Classroom” reports the results of economics experiments conducted with students in introductory economics classes following lectures on ethics. The results are sometimes enigmatic : non-effects obtain, even when the costs of reporting an effect are low in the survey study, whereas significant effects sometimes appear, when participants have material stakes in the economics experiments. These findings suggest that considerable subtlety is required in contemplating types of ethics instruction and in interpreting the effects.

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ROCKOFF Jonah (Columbia University) : The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation : Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations
Co-authors : Thomas Dee, Will Dobbie, and Brian Jacob

We show that the design and decentralized scoring of New York’s high school exit exams — the Regents Examinations — led to systematic manipulation of test scores just below important proficiency cutoffs.Exploiting a series of reforms that eliminated score manipulation, we find heterogeneous effects of test score manipulation on academic outcomes. While inflating a score increases the probability of a student graduating from high school by about 17 percentage points, the probability of taking advanced coursework declines by roughly 10 percentage points. These results are consistent with manipulation helping students on the margin of dropping out but hurting those with greater academic potential who are not pushed to gain a solid understanding of foundational material. Texte intégral [pdf]

TOM | 12:30-13:30

Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
RINCON ZAPATERO Juan Pablo (Université Carlos III Madrid) : Recursive Utility and Thompson Aggregators
Co-authors : BECKER R.

We reconsider the theory of Thompson aggregators proposed by Marinacci and Montruccio. First, we prove a variant of their Recovery Theorem estabilishing the existence of extremal solutions to the Koopmans equa- tion. Then, under more restrictive conditions, we demonstrate there is a unique solution to the Koopmans equation. Our proof is based on concave operator techniques as first developed by Kransosels¹kii. This differs from Marinacci and Montruccio¹s proof as well as proofs given by Martins de la Rocha and Vailakis.

Macroéconomie | 15:45-17:00

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
KARADI Peter (European Central Bank)

Vendredi 13 avril 2018

Orienter l’épargne vers l’économie réelle ...

Amphithéâtre, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
Téléchargez le programme en pdf

Casual Friday | 13:15-14:15

Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DUPRAZ Yannick (University of Warwick) : The Effect of Education on Polygamy : Evidence from Cameroon