Suivez-nous :

Lundi 9 octobre 2017

ROY | 17:00-18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
Co-authors : WOLITZKY Alexander (MIT) : Learning from Others’ Outcomes
Résumé

Abstract : I develop a simple model of social learning in which players observe others’ outcomes but not their actions. There is a continuum of players, and each player chooses once-and-for-all between a safe action (which succeeds with known probability) and a risky action (which succeeds with fixed but unknown probability, depending on the state of the world). The actions also differ in their costs. Before choosing, a player observes the outcomes of K others. There is always an equilibrium in which success is more likely in the good state, and this regularity property holds whenever the initial generation of players is not well-informed about the state. In the case of an outcome-improving innovation (where the risky action may yield a higher probability of success), players take the correct action as K ??. In the case of a cost-saving innovation (where the risky action involves saving a cost but accepting a lower probability of success), inefficiency persists as K ?? in any regular equilibrium. Whether inefficiency takes the form of under-adoption or over-adoption also depends on the nature of the innovation. Convergence of the population to equilibrium may be non-monotone.

Mardi 10 octobre 2017

Economie appliquée | 12:30-13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ROTUNNO Lorenzo (AMSE) : Trade in unhealthy foods and obesity : Evidence from Mexico
Co-authors : Osea Giuntella and Matthias Rieger

Trade | 14:45-16:15
ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405
LARCH Mario (Bayreuth) : *Trade and Investment in the Global Economy
Co-authors : James E. Anderson and Yoto V. Yotov
Texte intégral [pdf]

Migration | 16:30-19:30
Campus Jourdan - Salle R1-13
TBA
Résumé

Toman Barsbai (Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
"The Economics of Family Reunification - Theory and Evidence from the Universe of Filipino Immigrants to the US".

Maëlys de la Rupelle (Université de Cergy-Pontoise) :
"Managing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration : Evidence from Mexico" (joint with Isabelle Chort).

Mercredi 11 octobre 2017

Histoire économique | 12:30-14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BAILEY Marta (University of Michigan) : Prep School for Poor Kids : The Long-Term Effects of Head Start on Children

WIP | 11:00-12:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
FABRE Adrien : The returns from private and political connections : New evidence from French Municipalities
GUILLOT Malka (PSE) : The 75%tax on wages above 1 million in France : what behavorial responses ?
PERDRIX Elsa : The 75%tax on wages above 1 million in France : what behavorial responses ?

Jeudi 12 octobre 2017

Comportement | 11:00-12:00
Salle R2-21, PSE 48, bld Jourdan
JACQUEMET Nicolas. (Université Paris I and PSE) : Learning, Spillovers and Persistence : Institutions and the Dynamics of Cooperation
Co-authors : EMERIC Henry (Science Po and CEPR) ; GALBIATI Roberto (Science Po and CNRS)
Résumé

We study how cooperation-enforcing institutions dynamically affect values and behavior using a lab experiment designed to create individual specific histories of past institutional exposure. We show that the effect of past institutions is mostly due to “indirect” behavioral spillovers : facing penalties in the past increases partners’ cooperation in the past, which in turn positively affects ones’ own current behavior. We demonstrate that such indirect spillovers induce persistent effects of institutions. However, for interactions that occur early on, we find a negative effect of past enforcement due to differential learning under different enforcement institutions.

Behavior Working Group | 10:00-11:00
ETILE Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences : Some extensions
Co-authors : YIN Rémi (PSE)

Travail et économie publique | 12:30-13:45
TO Maxime (Institut des Politiques Publiques) : Labour supply and taxation with restricted choices
Résumé

A model of labour supply is developed in which observed hours reflect both the distribution of preferences and restrictions on the choice of hours. In the absence of information on the choice set facing each individual, observed hours may appear not to satisfy the revealed preference conditions for ‘rational’ choice. We focus on the case where the choice set contains at most two offers and show that when the choice set distribution is known, preferences can be identified. We then show that, where preferences are known, the choice set distribution can be fully recovered. Conditions for identification of both preferences and the distribution of choice sets are also developed. We illustrate this approach in a labour supply setting with nonlinear budget constraints. Non-linearities in the budget constraint are used to directly reveal restrictions on the choice set. This framework is used to study the labour supply behaviour of a large sample of working age mothers in the UK, accounting for nonlinearities in the tax and welfare benefit system, fixed costs of work and restrictions on hours choices.

Texte intégral [pdf]

Macroéconomie Workshop | 15:45-17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R1-09
DEBORTOLI Davide (CREI) : TBA

Vendredi 13 octobre 2017

Economie et psychologie | 11:00-12:30
MSE (S/17)
Georg Weizssacker (Humboldt Univ. Berlin) : TBA

Casual Friday Development Seminar | 12:45-13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JATIVA Ximena : Unintended Consequences of Road Rehabilitation in Tanzania : Market Participation, Prices and Welfare
Co-authors : DUMAS Christelle (U. Fribourg)