

Olivier Bos

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Research and Teaching Interests

Research Interests: Auction Theory, Contest Theory, Microeconomic Theory, Public Economics
Teaching Interests: Game Theory, Industrial Organisation, Microeconomic Theory

Position

2009 – Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Cologne.

Education

2005 – 2009 Ph.D. in Economics with Highest Honors, Graduate Program APE, Paris School of Economics (PSE).
Thesis Title: Essays in Auction Theory – Applications to Contests and Charity
PhD Committee: Prof. Gabrielle Demange (Advisor, PSE), Prof. Philippe Jehiel (PSE and UCL), Prof. Michel Le Breton (Toulouse School of Economics), Prof. Florence Naegelen (University of Franche-Comté), Prof. Régis Renault (University of Cergy-Pontoise)

2004 – 2005 Master in Economics, Graduate Program APE, Paris School of Economics

2002 – 2005 Graduate Diploma in Economics and Statistics at the ENSAE (Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Economique), Paris

Research Stay

2008 – 2009 Marie Curie Fellow at CORE (Université Catholique de Louvain) invited by Prof. Jean Hindrinks

2007 – 2008 Visiting Ph.D. Student (European Doctoral Programm) at the University of Bonn. Advisor: Prof. Benny Moldovanu

References

<u>Prof. Gabrielle Demange</u> (Primary Advisor) Paris School of Economics Tel: +33 1 43 13 63 27 demange@pse.ens.fr	<u>Prof. Arye Hillman</u> Bar-Ilan University Tel: + 972 3 531 8951 hillman@mail.biu.ac.il	<u>Prof. Benny Moldovanu</u> University of Bonn Tel: + 49 228 73 6395 mold@uni-bonn.de
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Fellowships and Awards

Summer 2009 Grant from the European Science Foundation Activity entitled 'Public Goods, Public Projects, Externalities'

2008 – 2009 Marie Curie Fellowship from the European Commission at CORE

2005 – 2008 Doctoral Fellowship from the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research

2004 – 2005 Master Scholarship from the EHESS

Teaching Experience

2008 – 2009	ENSAE, Teaching Assistant in Microeconomic Theory (Master Level)
2008 – 2009	ENSAE, Teaching Assistant in Game Theory (Master Level)
2005 – 2007	University of Paris X-Nanterre, Teaching Assistant in Industrial Organisation (B.A. Level in Economics)
2005 – 2007	ENSAE, Teacher in \LaTeX and \TeX (Undergraduate and Master Level)
2005 – 2006	ENSAE, Supervision of a Reading Group in Social Choice (Master Level)
2004 – 2005	University of Paris I-Sorbonne, Teaching Assistant in Probability (Second Year in Economics)
Summer 2003	Maison d'arrêt de Niort (French Jail), France, Teacher in Computer Science

Invited Seminars

2009	IZA (Bonn), Maastricht University, Humboldt University Berlin, University of Amsterdam (UvA), University of Cologne (Department of Business), University of Cologne (Department of Economics), Université catholique de Lille, University of St Andrews, WZB (Berlin)
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Conference Presentations

2010	Scheduled: RES Conference (University of Surrey)
2009	ESEM (Barcelona), SAET (Ischia), Conference on Economic Design (Maastricht), European Doctoral Program Jamboree (LSE), ECORE Summer School (Brussels), AFSE Conference (Nanterre)
2008	LAMES (Rio de Janeiro), GAMES (Chicago), CESifo Venice Workshop on “Advances in the Theory of Contests and its Applications”, Symposium of Economic Analysis (Zaragoza)
2007	SAET (Kos), ECORE Summer School (Louvain-la-Neuve), SMYE (Hamburg)

Research Papers

“Charity Auctions for the Happy Few”

Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-pay auctions. We demonstrate that the first-price and second-price winner-pay auctions outperform the first-price and second-price all-pay auction when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. To prove it, we consider a framework with complete information. Complete information is realistic and corresponds to events that occur, for instance, in a local service club (such as a voluntary organization) or in a show business dinner.

“All-Pay Auctions with Endogeneous Rewards”, joint with Martin Ranger (University of Bonn)

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. Valuations are endogenous and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. Some key properties of R&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this framework. Once the unique equilibrium in mixed strategies analyzed, we derive a closed form of the expected expenditure of both players. We characterize the expected expenditure by the means of incomplete Beta functions. We focus on unordered valuations.

“Wars of Attrition with Stochastic Competition”

Contrary to winner-pay auctions and first-price all-pay auctions with stochastic competition, as regards wars of attrition, it does not directly follow from the first order condition that the equilibrium strategy should be equal to a weighted average. We believe these characterizations could be useful in many contests and charity issues.

“How Lotteries Outperform Auctions for Charity”

In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among valuations with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.

Work in Progress

“Charitable Asymmetric Bidders”

Recent papers show that all-pay auction is better at raising money for charity than first-price auction with symmetric bidders and under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with bidders enough asymmetric and under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We determine all-pay auction still runs more money than first-price auction. Thus, all-pay auctions should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.

“Unraveling Matching for Labor Markets”, joint with Martin Ranger

“Enchères, Tournois, un Même Mécanisme” (available only in French)

Refereeing Activities

Social Choice and Welfare, The Review of Economic Design, member of the program committee for the *Spring Meeting of Young Economist* 2008

Administrative Duty

2010 – Microeconomic Seminar organizer, Department of Economics, University of Cologne